FACES AND INTERFACES
OF INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT

ROGER GIBBINS,
Department of Political Science,
University of Calgary,
Calgary, Alberta,
Canada, T2N 1N4.

and

J. HICK PONTING,
Department of Sociology,
University of Calgary,
Calgary, Alberta,
Canada, T2N 1N4.

ABSTRACT/RESUME

The authors present a model of Indian government which recognizes the importance of resources and relationships. Four requisites for successful self-government and the ways to implement them are identified: legitimacy, social integration, political articulation, and political integration and consolidation. These processes will occur gradually over a transitional period of learning.

Les auteurs présentent un modèle de gouvernement autochtone qui reconnaît l'importance des ressources et des rapports sociaux. On constate quatre choses qui sont nécessaires pour une autonomie réussie, et l'on indique les manières de les exécuter: légitimité, intégration sociale, articulation politique et intégration et consolidation politiques. Ces processus se produisent petit à petit à travers une période transitoire d'apprentissage.

The Penner Committee's report on Indian self-government identified various requirements or requisites of successful Indian self-government, including accountability to the local Indian electorate, powers of taxation, control over membership, recognition from the courts, and an adequate resource base. This paper identifies several other requisites for successful self-government and examines some of the detailed considerations involved in putting those requisites in place.

The paper proceeds from an assumption of the pivotal importance of resources and relationships. That is, we view the mobilization and allocation of resources through interpersonal and interorganizational relationships to be the essence of the phenomenon of governing. Given that assumption, it is helpful to think of the operating environment of an Indian government in the manner in which we have portrayed it in the three dimensional model in Figure 1.

The central feature of the model is that the box or cube has six faces or surfaces. Each face represents a different set of actors. Indian individuals are assigned the top surface, a position of prominence and symbolic significance. The bottom surface is assigned to the federal government. The front face, also a position of prominence, represents local-level Indian governments; according to Indian political organizations and the Penner Report, these local Indian governments are to be the basic unit of self-government. The back surface represents provincial or territorial governments, while the right side of the box represents what we have called "supra-level" Indian governments, such as tribal councils, provincial councils, or a national assembly of chiefs or other elected Indian representatives. Finally, on the left side we have other external organizations such as municipal governments, foreign governments, multinational corporations, international tribunals, labour unions, and other interest groups. The model rests upon a base or foundation of various resources, including human skills and aptitudes (for example, professionals and risk-taking entrepreneurs), fiscal transfer payments from other governments, natural resources, computer and telecommunication technology and others.

The attainment of any given requisite will usually involve the on-going cultivation of social, political, and economic relationships which link actors on two or more adjacent or opposite faces. Furthermore, any given face may itself be a fairly complex mosaic. For instance, the federal government is no unitary actor, as Indian bands and political organizations have found, and as authors such as Weaver (1981) and Schultz (1981) have documented. Even the local constituency of Indian individuals, while far less heterogeneous than the constituency of provincial or national Indian organizations, may nevertheless be organized into competing clans, classes, reserves, or other interest groups.

The requisites for successful Indian self-government which this paper considers are the following: (i) legitimacy in the eyes of the "grass-roots" members of the local Indian community (ii) mechanisms of social integration; (iii) the political articulation of Indian interests; and (iv) political integration and consolidation of population. We shall consider each in turn.
FIGURE 1: THE FACES AND INTERFACES OF INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT
LEGITIMACY

The building of legitimacy for a self-governing Indian regime, its incumbents, its policy outputs, and its policy processes is a phenomenon which will involve a local Indian government primarily interacting with the top face of our cube - that is, with individual Indian constituents. Yet, other actors on other faces of the cube are also relevant here. For instance, to the extent that those external actors officially recognize and carry on relations with a local Indian government, they may confer a degree of legitimacy upon it in the mind of its local constituents (for instance, through the visit of some dignitary). Conversely, if those external actors are themselves stigmatized or in some way delegitimated, their interactions with local Indian government officials can undermine the legitimacy of the latter.

Legitimacy itself is a multi-faceted concept. In essence, the difference between an illegitimate regime and a legitimate regime is the difference between mere power (or naked power), on the one hand, and authority enjoying respect and prestige, on the other hand. The famous sociologist, Max Weber, has pointed out that authority may derive from a leader's charismatic relationship with followers, from the leader's adherence to traditions and moral principles (for example, religious beliefs) of the group, or from adherence to the rule of law. When legitimacy is present, the constituents of an Indian government will be characterized by feelings of trust in the Indian government and a sense of political efficacy. Conversely, the loss of legitimacy is a very serious matter that entails feelings of alienation and sometimes withdrawal of voluntary compliance. The deleterious effects of a loss of legitimacy are no strangers to Indians who have observed events prior to and subsequent to the Assembly of First Nations' 1985 presidential election. The demise of Pierre Trudeau in western Canada only a few years after the height of "Trudeaumania" is testimony to the fact that not even charismatically legitimated authority can be counted upon to withstand the delegitimating effects of government actions that are perceived to violate important societal norms or values.

Indian self-governments will be vulnerable to problems of maintaining legitimacy. That vulnerability derives in part from the unrealistically high expectations which are likely to be held by many of their constituents who, like other decolonizing peoples around the world, will likely have experienced a "revolution of rising expectations". The onus will be on Indian governments to "deliver the goods" to their constituents - to demonstrate convincingly that life under the new regime is significantly different from and better than life under the federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) and especially to ensure that the rewards of self-government accrue not just to a privileged Indian elite or middle class well-positioned to "cash in" on the new opportunities, but also to the Indian proletariat. The question arises, therefore, as to how Indian self-governments can maximize their legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents. The discussion of legitimacy which follows is
virtue of aboriginal rights.

The ingredients of legitimacy will vary from one political culture to another. Doern and Phidd (1983:54-57) point to the following values as dominant ones which guide policy formulation and legitimate policy products in the larger Canadian society: efficiency; individual liberty; stability (of income and of other conditions); redistribution and equality; equity national identity, unity, and integration; and regional diversity and sensitivity. Although Indian governments may have to appeal to other values to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents, to the extent that Indian governments lack autonomy from provincial and federal non-Indian governments, they will also have to legitimate their policies and programmes to those external governments in terms of the values listed by Doern and Phidd. For instance, an economic development programme of an Indian government may have to be legitimated to an external funding agency on the grounds of efficiency, while at the same time having to be legitimated to Indian constituents on the basis of job creation. 1

Students of public policy stress that the process of policy formulation is almost as important as the policy products which emerge from that process. Indian self-governments will presumably resurrect some features of the traditional decision-making procedures which were followed prior to the colonial period. These procedures will likely yield policies which are more attuned to local needs than policies which have been formulated in the distant national or provincial capital. As such, they should carry more legitimacy in the mind of Indian constituents. To do so, however, the policy formulation process must meet certain conditions, the most important of which is that it must involve if not actual consensus, at least consultation with elders and informal interest groups in the community. The greater the degree of participation of people in policy decision-making the greater their sense of ownership of that policy and the less the likelihood that they will challenge it as illegitimate.

Also of great importance in legitimating Indian governments is that the Indian people be able to recognize themselves in the symbolic products of the Indian state. As Raymond Breton has written:

"Individuals expect to recognize themselves in the public institutions. They expect a certain degree of consistency between their private identities and the symbolic contents upheld by public authorities, embedded in the societal institutions, and celebrated in public events. Otherwise, individuals feel like strangers in the society; they feel that the society is not their society."

To accomplish this process can involve a difficult balancing act, as Indian government leaders seek to cope with those tensions between traditionalism and modernity that are found in any decolonizing regime. However, one step in the direction of having the symbolic outputs of Indian governments mirror the constituents of those governments involves the early issuance of a manifesto or declaration that embodies the aspirations, values, first principles, and symbols of the constituents and makes promises to those constituents - in short, an
ideology. Subsequent policy initiatives can be related back to the manifesto/declaration and justified in terms of its contents. Another step in the same direction is to explain carefully how government actions are consistent with, or an extension of, Indian traditions and Indian law.

Political economists writing on the state in advanced capitalist societies alert us to another potential legitimacy problem. They contend that the state in such societies fulfills three basic functions: (i) facilitating the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few; (ii) preserving social harmony by legitimating the existing social class structure to those who are not its main beneficiaries; and (iii) exerting social control through its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Although very few, if any, Indian self-governments will possess the characteristics of states in advanced capitalist societies, many will become entangled with the federal and/or provincial-levels of the Canadian state and may thereby become caught up in the fundamental contradiction between the first and second functions identified above. As the latent contradiction between the first and second functions becomes manifest, a crisis of legitimacy emerges. Indian economic development programs, particularly during a Progressive Conservative federal or provincial regime which places emphasis on economic recovery through entrepreneurial initiative, may be particularly susceptible to this type of legitimacy problem.

Perceptions of legitimacy are ultimately rooted in perceptions that government actions, or at least government procedures for deciding upon those actions are just, and that power has not been abused (for example, through excessive patronage) or left unused. Summarizing our main points above, we believe that an Indian self-government will be able to maintain legitimacy with its constituents if it consciously strives to:

- avoid rhetoric which will inflate expectations to unrealistic levels;
- pursue re-distributional policies;
- take into account the policy values of external funding agencies;
- devote almost as much attention to the processes of policy formulation (such as, composition of advisory bodies, broad consultation and participation) as to the policy products themselves;
- devote special attention to producing symbols which reflect the constituency served;
- relate Indian government actions to traditional values, laws, and practices and to an ideology articulated in a manifesto or declaration; and
- remain skeptical of policy suggestions designed to help people cope with the status quo rather than changing the status quo.

MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

We turn now to the second requisite for successful Indian self-government mechanisms of social integration. Societies, large and small, are held together by various means. Some are held together by means of a shared racial or ethnic identity, others by a consensus on a set of norms and values which guide daily
life, others by coercion, others by relationships of economic exchange and interdependence, others by a pattern of cross-cutting cleavages which cancel out each other rather than reinforcing each other, others by kinship bonds across lines of group cleavage, others by political patronage, and most by a combination of all of these. In the past, many Indian communities have attained their internal cohesion not only from a shared identity and shared set of values, but also from a shared object of hostility (the federal government and its Department of Indian Affairs) and a shared sense of misfortune and injustice. In some communities, these dynamics have proven inadequate to provide the basis for group mobilization in pursuit of collective goals. Indeed, in some Indian communities, the integrative effects of these shared characteristics have proven inferior to the disintegrative effects of these and other social forces. Consequently, various Indian communities today stand divided along various lines of cleavage based on one or more of such tensions as those between clans and classes, those between persons with full legal status and persons without, those between the generations, those between the alienated and the committed, and others.

Self-government is likely to entail an increase in the volume and scale of conflict, as it has in various other decolonizing societies (Weiner, 1966:551-562). However, some scapegoats and some conflict-mediating structures (such as DIAND and the RCMP) will no longer be present in the community and the need will arise to adapt traditional conflict-resolution institutions to contemporary times, and even to devise new institutions. Some models will be available from non-aboriginal society in the form of ombudsmen, human rights commissions, regulatory agencies, crisis intervention teams of social workers, small claims courts, counselling agencies, arbitration boards, and conciliation boards.

In addition to considering what, if anything, can be learned from those models and from Indian history, leaders in Indian governments will need to self-consciously promote other devices of community integration. Among these measures might be: support for the resurgence of traditional Indian religions, the sponsoring of exchange visits with other aboriginal communities inside or outside Canada (to foster an aboriginal identity), concerted efforts at retrieval of artifacts stolen from the community and now housed in public or private collections, attempts to introduce a variant of the potlatch among peoples who have never had this custom, the introduction of universal adult manual labour obligations (a "sweat tax"), holding sporting and cultural events involving external competitors, creating awards and holding ceremonies to honour community members who have exhibited exceptional community service or other forms of merit, establishing voluntary associations within the community (for example, to render such service as cleaning up the Reserve, where needed), building bridges between the generations, and adoption of norms of restitution for some forms of illegal behaviour. The creation of a low-power radio and/or television station to serve the Reserve and to provide alternatives to value systems promoted by the non-Indian commercial broadcast media would also foster community integration.

To reiterate, the advent of Indian self-government will necessitate a con-
certed effort to develop new vehicles for conflict regulation and resolution, and for developing group cohesion in pursuit of collective goals. Although Indian self-governments will be able to institute some of these mechanisms at little or no expense, others will entail substantial direct costs. The temptation will be great to divert scarce resources to other ends which have more tangible indicators of attainment or a vocal and well-organized constituency lobbying for them. To succumb to that temptation would be shortsighted; the long-term costs of ignoring the need for conscious mechanisms of social integration may be great, both in sociological terms and in terms of associated economic (and perhaps even political) costs. Furthermore, imaginative leaders will look to the other faces of our cube to find some of the resources needed for attaining this requisite. For instance, on the left face of the cube are museums, philanthropic foundations, wholesale suppliers of equipment or building materials, manufacturers or retailers who might donate awards or prizes or uniforms as a public relations gesture, and so on. On the back face of the cube is the provincial government, which may have funds available for precisely these forms of activity through its lottery corporation, its preventive social services or community health budget, its ministry of culture or youth or recreation or fitness and amateur sport, or some other department or agency.

By way of summary, the following practical suggestions can be offered:

- the development of integrative symbols and mechanisms must be treated as a priority rather than as an expendable frill;
- leaders should look both to traditional Indian societies (not just their own) and to contemporary non-Indian societies for conflict-regulation and conflict-resolution mechanisms that might be adapted for use in their own situation;
- recognizing the bitter residue of the "divide and conquer" tactics which have been pursued in the past by governments in their dealing with Indians, Indian elected officials and candidates for elected office should eschew divisive political strategies;
- mass media, ceremonies, and the prestige of local leaders should be mobilized to serve integrative ends;
- the fact that community integration is an internal matter should not deter leaders from looking outside the community for resources to be mobilized to serve integrative ends.

THE POLITICAL ARTICULATION OF INDIAN INTERESTS

In this paper, we have no intention of setting out a definitive set of criteria by which one could judge the success or failure of Indian governments. One criterion, however, seems clear – Indian governments will be successful if they significantly improve the life-chances of those individuals living within their jurisdiction, if they improve the material and social well-being of Indian people. The capacity of Indian governments to do so will depend in large part on their resource base. If that base is inadequate, if the land is marginal, natural
resources scarce and fiscal support from the broader society meager, Indian governments will have great difficulty in delivering the economic promise of self-government. One cannot squeeze blood from a stone. There is, then, an obvious linkage between the resource base of Indian communities and the economic prosperity of individuals living within such communities.

As our model illustrates, however, that linkage is not direct. Standing between individuals and the resource base is a complex political environment encompassing community-based Indian governments, supra-level Indian governments, the federal and provincial governments, and a host of private actors including corporations and interest groups. The upward flow of resources from the base of the model to individuals at the top is filtered through this political environment. In terms of the model, resources flow upward over the five faces of the cube rather than flowing through the middle of the cube directly to individuals. As a consequence, the flow of resources will be significantly affected by the political relationships which take place along the edges of the cube. For example, the distribution of resources within the local community will be determined in part by the relationship between individuals and the local Indian government. Local politics, in other words, will have a significant impact on who gets what, on how resource shares and economic opportunities are distributed within the community. To take another example, the relationship between local Indian governments and the private sector could play a very important role in the potential flow of wealth from natural resource developments; will Indian governments be able to negotiate development and marketing agreements that will maximize the economic return to the Indian community, or will they find themselves unable to extract this return from a competitive and potentially exploitative marketplace?

In short, the relationships captured by the edges of our model can be expected to have a major impact on the flow of resources, and thus on the ultimate capacity of Indian governments to deliver a higher level of material prosperity and social benefits to individual Indians. To explore this point further, we would like to address two of the relationships captured in our model - that between Band governments and the Government of Canada, and that between Band governments and other Indian political organizations and governments.

Regarding Band governments and the Canadian government, at least in the short run, a large part of the resource base for Indian communities will be in the form of fiscal transfers from the Government of Canada. For Indian communities lacking a viable natural resource base, such transfers could provide the major resource base for the indefinite future. These transfers, however, can best be seen as a variable that is subject to change over time. While the rationale for such transfers may be anchored on the bedrock of aboriginal rights and the past surrender of aboriginal land, it cannot be guaranteed that the government will agree to fiscal transfers sufficient to meet the social needs and economic aspirations of Indian communities. Given the past history of Indian-government relations in Canada, we cannot assume that future governments will react favourably or with sympathy to the fiscal needs of Indian communities.
The upshot of this is that Indian governments must act vigorously to protect Indian interests within the broader Canadian political system. In our model, the corresponding interface is that between local Indian governments and the federal government. The model, it should be stressed, does not show a direct link between Indian individuals and the federal government. In fact, this link will exist so long as the evolution of self-government does not interfere with the federal franchise. As long as Indians retain the right to vote in national elections they will, as individuals, be able to use the ballot to protect and promote their interests within the broader political system. Realistically, however, the electoral power of Indians will be slight; the Indian population is simply too small and too thinly dispersed over federal constituencies to be a significant electoral factor in any but a small handful of constituencies. Therefore individual Indians will have to rely upon intergovernmental relations - upon the interaction between their Band government and the federal government - as their first line of political defence.

The effectiveness of Band governments within this political arena will depend in part on how capable such governments are of mobilizing their own political resources. Are they politically informed and astute? Do they enjoy the full support of their constituents? Are they seen as legitimate spokesmen by the federal government? However, it will also depend upon the institutional structure of the Canadian government. If, for example, there were to be established a gatekeeping agency through which Indian interests could be channelled into the federal government, such an arrangement would greatly simplify the intergovernmental task facing Indian governments. If, however, there is no such focal point, if each Band government has to deal independently with the host of departments, agencies and regulatory bodies which make up the federal government, the intergovernmental task could be overwhelming and certainly beyond the capacity of relatively small Bands.

At present, DIAND provides a single point of entry into the federal political arena. If DIAND is eventually to be disbanded, some replacement agency located at the interface of the federal and Band governments may be required to reduce the intergovernmental load to manageable proportions. Here the Penner Report recommends the creation of a Ministry of State from Indian First Nations Relations, a ministry that would act as a bureaucratic and political advocate within the federal government for Indian interests. While the past performance of DIAND raises some concern that any such agency might be a mixed blessing, some organizational interface will be required.

It should be noted that our model shows an interface between Indian individuals and provincial governments, an interface captured at present by the provincial franchise. However, for the same reasons noted above, we would not expect Indians to be a significant provincial electoral force in the years to come. Thus, to the extent that Indian interests are to be protected and promoted within the provincial political arena, the primary interface will be that between Band and provincial governments. As our model now stands, that interface is not shown, a feature that reflects in part an understandable reluctance on the part of Indians to contemplate direct government-to-government relationships
with the provinces. Yet over the long run, such relationships will have to be established because provincial governments will affect the flow of resources to Indian communities and individuals. For example, Indian access to provincial educational facilities may well be the subject to intergovernmental negotiation and agreements.

In drawing this part of the discussion to a close, there is a broader point to be made. As self-government is implemented in the years ahead, many and perhaps most of the political concerns of Indians will be addressed within Indian political institutions. Individual Indians, however, will continue to have an interest in an array of issues that will remain under the jurisdiction of the federal and provincial governments. Examples here might include disarmament, pollution control, free trade, and governmental support for advanced education. It is thus essential that individual Indians retain some form of political expression and representation within the broader political system. The federal and provincial franchises provide the major method, augmented through conventional interest group politics. With luck, however, self-government will also provide a governmental voice for Indians, a voice that will enhance the political power of individual Indians within the political system.

This discussion suggests that the following points be brought to the fore in any discussion of the implementation of Indian government:

- an effective, working relationship with the federal government will be essential if the resource base of most self-governing Indian communities is to be protected;
- such a relationship would be facilitated by the creation of a new bureaucratic body which could provide an effective interface between Band governments and the host of departments, agencies and regulatory bodies comprising the federal government;
- over the long run, a similar relationship will have to be established with provincial governments;
- intergovernmental relations provide an important means of supplementing the electoral voice of Indians within the broader political process.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND POPULATION CONSOLIDATION

The second set of relationships are those between Band governments and other Indian governments. A chief theme here is political integration and population consolidation. Although the cornerstone in the evolution of Indian government will be the Band, there will also be a need for larger Indian governments, perhaps fashioned along tribal, provincial or even national lines, but in any event transcending the local community. The need for such supra-governments can be traced both to the institutional structure of the Canadian federal state, and to the economies of scale that such governments would offer to local communities.

The implementation of Indian government will require a considerable degree of institutional adaptation on the part of the Canadian federal state.
There will need to be, for example, a new constitutional division of powers with respect to Indian people and the creation of new bureaucratic entities to manage the relationship between Indian governments and the Government of Canada. There are, however, limits to the amount of institutional adaptation that one can reasonably expect, and those limits probably do not extend to the incorporation of large numbers of individual Band governments into the constitutional and institutional structure of the Canadian state. Given that there could potentially be close to 600 self-governing Indian communities, and at the very least scores of such communities, effective political integration will require some governmental orchestration of individual First Nation governments.

The limits to accommodation can perhaps best be illustrated by reference to executive federalism generally, and to the First Minister's Conference (FMC) more specifically. Over the last three decades, Canadian political life has been increasingly characterized by, and to a degree dominated by, executive federalism (Smiley, 1980). This term refers primarily to the interaction between the political executives of the national and provincial governments, and secondarily to the interaction among provincial governments. Executive interaction takes place at several levels; it may entail deputy ministers and at times less senior bureaucrats, ministers in the federal and provincial cabinets and, in the case of the First Ministers' Conference, the prime minister of Canada and the ten provincial premiers. Meetings between the federal and provincial governments occur almost continuously. Over the past five years, for example, officials of the Alberta government have met with their federal counterparts on the average of 125 times a year.²

This network of intergovernmental meetings, negotiations and agreements is not only complex, it is also of great importance to the delivery of a wide range of social and economic programs. Indeed, few if any programs lack a significant intergovernmental dimension. If Indian government is to be successfully implemented, it is imperative that such governments be in some way plugged into this network, that they are not left as bystanders to what has become the essential feature of the Canadian federal system. Yet, any effective integration will be very difficult for individual Band governments. Not only may the process be too complex to handle for small Band governments with limited human and political resources, but there are practical limits to the number of government actors that can "sit around the table".³ There will be considerable, if not irresistible, pressure from the federal and provincial governments for Indian governments to speak through a single voice, or at the very least through a very small number of voices. While one can imagine federal-provincial conferences at which Indians are represented by a single participant who can speak on behalf of Indian interests in general, one cannot imagine a situation in which scores of representatives from individual Band governments are full participants or active participants.

This point can perhaps best be illustrated with reference to the centrepiece of executive federalism, the First Ministers' Conference. Canada has already established the precedent of Indian representation at FMCs which deal with aboriginal concerns, and with it the problems of trying to represent a very
diverse Indian population through a limited number of conference participants. If Indian representation is to be a regular feature at FMCs, or if Indians win some formal role in the constitutional amending formula, the numerous First Nation governments will have to speak through a single voice. It is unlikely in the extreme that the present First Ministers would accept a situation in which the Government of Ontario, Quebec or Alberta had but a single representative, or the Government of Canada for that matter, while a larger number of Indian representatives sat around the same table. Moreover, the Indian representative would have to have the power to speak on behalf of Indian governments and without those governments refusing to ratify any agreement reached at the FMC. The constraints of executive federalism, in other words, will necessarily limit the political autonomy of Band governments. Some autonomy, we submit, will have to be sacrificed to a larger Indian government in order to secure access to the intergovernmental process.

If, then, we envision a future in which Indian representatives are full and active participants within executive federalism, we also envision a future in which the totality of Band governments speaks through a single voice, or at least through a very limited number of voices. That voice, it must be stressed, would have to be governmental in character. It could not be an organization like the Assembly of First Nations, a body from which individual Bands can withdraw at will and a body that is unable to impose decisions upon its constituent members.

The need for supra-level Indian governments may be seen as an unwelcome development. Certainly it complicates the implementation process, and may well engage the same internal cleavages which currently have thrown the Assembly of First Nations into political upheaval. More importantly, supra-level governments would limit the very Band autonomy that self-government hopes to achieve. There is, however, a very positive side to the development in that supra-level governments may help to overcome some substantial economies of scale which threaten the viability of self-government in many and perhaps even most Indian communities.

One of the facts of life in Canada is that the Indian population is widely dispersed and highly fragmented. For instance, there are almost 600 Indian Bands in Canada with an average population of only about 600 persons. Those Bands hold almost 2,300 Reserves (not all of which are settled), such that the daily rounds of, say, a social worker might require that s/he travel 20 kilometers or more, one way, to visit the next client. Projections are that by a decade from now perhaps only about one in every five Bands will have a population of 3,000 or more individuals. Furthermore, almost one-third of status Indians live off-reserve and a further block of Indians, perhaps as much as 76,000 people or 20% of the presently registered Indian population has been deprived of legal status as Indians because of federal statute.

One of the regrettable consequences of the small size, dispersal, and fragmentation of the Indian population is that the per capita overhead costs and operating costs of delivering services to that population will be large; otherwise stated, efficiency will be low. Thus, Indians face the prospects of moving from a
situations of DIAND’s inefficiency attributable in significant part to its large size and centralization, to a situation of inefficiency attributable to Bands’ small size and decentralization. It should be stressed that this forecast of inefficiency in the delivery of services by Indian governments in no way casts aspersions upon the level of competence or commitment or integrity or diligence of Indian government leaders and their civil servants; rather, it is based solely on mathematical facts of life.

As noted above, the Indian population is not only fragmented and dispersed; it is also small. Assuming that intelligence, aptitudes, and talents are distributed over that small population in the same manner as in the general population and also assuming that certain skills are under-represented in that population due to a history of early leaving from school (the effect of high drop-out/push-out rates), we are left with the conclusion that the pool of human resources and expertise in most communities will be rather shallow. Some Indian governments will simply lack the requisite skills in their labour force to accomplish some goals, because their strengths lie in other realms. Furthermore, they may also lack the budget to hire consultants who can provide that expertise. Unfortunately, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that some of the human talent that does exist in the Indian population has been rendered unavailable due to escapist behaviour (such as alcohol abuse), alienation, disillusionment and assimilation, and the former Section 12.1.b. of the Indian Act.

We submit that the odds against Indian governments, while not insurmountable, are so formidable that Indian governments simply cannot afford the luxury of ineconomies of scale or the luxury of the underutilization of human talents. Parenthetically, we might also note the problems of "burn-out" that may come to be associated with the very protracted political and constitutional struggle for Indian government, and with the problems of implementation still to be faced (Coles, 1964:305-315). Such problems are exacerbated by a shallow resource pool. By way of comparison, if one thousand or even twenty-thousand highly-skilled Quebecois become disillusioned with the goal of Quebec sovereignty or if they simply "burn-out" after years of involvement in the independence movement, their loss can be easily absorbed by a province with a population of more than six million. However, if even one thousand highly-skilled Indians abandon the cause of Indian government, the effect on the implementation of self-government could be devastating.

In our opinion, there is a pressing need for consolidation of the Indian population. This implies welcoming back enfranchised Indians as reinstated Band members. At the risk of challenging any traditions behind sex-roles, we submit that it also implies the exploitation of the full potential of those status and non-status Indian women who have hitherto been confined to traditional roles. (There are many roles, such as organizing roles, in which such utilization of women would not bring them into direct competition with Indian men.)

The consolidation of the Indian population also implies that Bands at least consider attempting to negotiate land "swaps" which would involve the exchange of non-contiguous reserve lands for crown lands contiguous to their main reserve. (Once again, we have another face of the cube being brought into
play in what, on the surface, would appear to be an internal matter for Indian
governments.) In some cases this re-arranging may not be possible, for instance,
due to the sacred nature of the land which would have to be given up. In other
cases, it would have to be approached with the utmost political and sociological
circumspection (and in the end might nevertheless prove impossible) due to the
fact that it would involve the relocation of some residents.

The consolidation of population and land represent only two strategies
that are available to Indian governments faced with economy-of-scale problems.
Indian governments could also consider negotiating contracts with non-Indian
governments for the provision of services to small non-Indian communities
adjacent to Indian Reserves. This strategy could prove mutually beneficial in
the sense of lowering, for both governments, the \textit{per capita} costs of delivering
services. It is also consistent with the thrust of some provincial governments
towards privatization of the delivery of services or otherwise reducing the size
of provincial bureaucracies. Band governments' hiring (as regular staff) of former
employees of a provincial or municipal government agency might also provide
a vehicle for co-opting some non-Indian talent (for example, middle level mana-
gers) to supplement the Indian labour force, while at the same time retaining
Indian control and avoiding the exorbitant profit-taking of non-Indian con-
sulting firms or service delivery firms.

Perhaps the most promising strategy lies in the creation of supra-level
Indian governments, a strategy that may well be forced upon Indians in any
event by the institutional structure of the Canadian federal state. These larger
governmental units may be able to achieve economies of scale unattainable by
smaller Band governments. They could provide specialized services that smaller
governments could not. Thus, we might find speech therapists, management
consultants, curriculum designers, and petroleum geologists all working for the
supra-level government and, in so doing, providing a wide array of specialized
services to Band governments. Such specialists could provide an important
buffer between the local community and what could be a predatory external
environment. They could also play an important role in handling intergovern-
mental relations between Indian communities on the one hand, and the federal
and provincial governments on the other.

The creation of supra-level governments will not be a straight-forward
task. In some cases, it would entail Bands submerging their identity and even
ceasing to exist as a separate entity. This process will be perceived as threatening
by some Indian politicians and Indian Band employees, and it runs contrary to
such differentiating factors as different levels of wealth across Bands and even
different treaty entitlements across Bands. However, the gains to be made in
increased political "clout", in the elimination of duplicate organizational infra-
structures, and in overcoming economy-of-scale problems are considerable and
cannot be dismissed lightly. Some of the financial resources which would
thereby be freed could be used for new endeavours which would draw upon
the talents of persons whose jobs became redundant with the consolidation.

In summary, the following recommendations can be made:
- discussions about the implementation of Indian government should address the need for consolidation of the Indian population both in terms of creating supra-level Indian governments which would transcend the level of local Bands, and in terms of land exchanges to expand the contiguous land base of Indian governments;
- such governments could be used to overcome economy-of-scale problems, and to provide a wide array of specialized services to Band communities;
-- in the implementation process, considerable thought must be given not only to the design of Band-level governments, but also to their integration with other Indian governments and with the encompassing political system. Band level governments will not and cannot stand in isolation.

CONCLUSION

In order to be more concrete, some specific suggestions can be given here as examples of governmental linking. Indian self-government is not just a matter of principle and constitutional recognition. In the context of the complexities, constraints, and interdependencies of modern industrial society, its implementation will be a formidable challenge, as most Indian leaders are well aware. However, its advent will not be like a sudden plunge into an icy lake; in most cases it will instead be phased in incrementally over a transition period. That transition period will also serve as a learning period in which Indian governments will learn from the triumphs and mistakes of their own and other aboriginal governments. Indeed, various Indian governments are already well-advanced along that learning curve and for them little that we have had to say in this paper will be new. Others, however, are in the earlier stages of the transformation and find that even academics have ideas and suggestions which they might wish to consider.

Although some of our remarks may evoke reactions of discouragement in some quarters, there are also considerable grounds for a more optimistic outlook for Indian self-government. For instance, some of the requisites which we have identified (for example, manipulation of symbols to serve integrative ends) will be met through Indian political leaders simply following their own political "instincts" or "intuition". By way of further example, one of the requisites we identified - legitimacy - is generated not only through calculated political acts, but also through demonstrated effectiveness at governing. The results of Indian control of Indian education (especially the lower push-out/drop-out rates) and the increasing numbers of Indians acquiring post-secondary education are also grounds for encouragement in that they both point to a deepening of the pool of human talent in the Indian population. Furthermore, the challenges and opportunities offered by Indian self-governments, if and when accompanied by an up-graded fiscal resource base, may attract back to the Reserve many of those who had left to pursue challenges or opportunities elsewhere.

One type of person who might find Reserves increasingly attractive if a more adequate fiscal base were in place is the entrepreneur. Although elsewhere the privatization of government services has justifiably raised concerns about
the quality of service (Hurl, 1984:395-405), there may be a role for Indian entrepreneurs in this realm. That is, Indian governments might wish to consider the option of having firms owned by Indian entrepreneurs supply some services that might otherwise be provided to Bands through an Indian civil service. The advantage to this approach is that the profits of Reserve-based firms could be taxed by the Indian government.

Modern micro-electronic and communications technology provides further grounds for optimism about the prospects of Indian self-governments attaining the requisites which we have identified in this paper. Telematics (the linking of computers and telecommunications), computer networks, computer conferencing, telephone conference cans, microcomputers, and remote terminals linked by satellite or telephone lines to a main-frame computer at some "host institution" (such as a university or a supra-level Indian government) can make a significant contribution to bridging distances, to surmounting problems of isolation, and to minimizing travel, transport, and communication costs and some of the ineconomies of scale to which we referred earlier. To take but one example pertaining to the back, bottom, and front faces of our cube, there will be much to be gained by Indian governments sharing with each other knowledge not only of the strategies and tactics employed by government negotiators and by Indian leaders in earlier negotiations, but also the products of those negotiations, for the agreement reached might serve as a useful model which could be adapted or adopted by Indian governments which come later. Computer communications could be well-suited to the efficient sharing of such information. Indeed, there is excitement and challenge to be had in the exploitation of such "state of the art" modern technology to meet the contemporary needs of Indian communities.

In mobilizing this resource, the left face of our cube should not be neglected, for arrangements can be struck with computer equipment companies which are prepared to supply computers to Indian governments (as they do to universities) as part of a larger market development and/or public relations strategy. Such firms might also be interested in working with Indian governments on product development projects intended to enhance the user-friendliness or cross-cultural utility of the company's product.

In closing, we wish to make a few comments which address another facet of the left face of our cube - namely, the universities and colleges. We have placed considerable emphasis upon the present smallness of the Indian population and the resultant scarcity of highly skilled labour. We have also placed much emphasis upon the resource base of Indian governments; indeed, perhaps the single most important determinant of the success of Indian self-government will be the adequacy of the fiscal, land, and natural resource base of those governments. Assuming that the resource base provided from the federal and provincial faces of our cube will prove inadequate to meet the large and pressing needs of Indian governments, the need arises for Indian governments to establish relationships with other organizations which can supplement that resource base. Vis-a-vis the shallow base of highly skilled labour, the universities and colleges provide one such supplemental source of resources.
Our comments below about universities and colleges are based on the assumption that they are public institutions upon which Indians have a claim -- a claim which extends beyond merely offering Native Studies courses. Universities and colleges are funded from a tax base which indirectly derives from lands from which Indians were evicted. As such, they have an obligation, it could be argued, to provide some kind of a return to Native people. That return could take the form of access not only to the expertise of the faculty but also to the facilities of the institution. As part of the community service function to which most universities and colleges pay at least lip-service, they could be pressed by Indians to provide inter-disciplinary teams of faculty members to serve as unpaid consultants (for example, architects, engineers, sociologists, computer programmers, political scientists, community health professionals, and others) either on specific projects or goals, or in the development of models (prototypes) and packages amenable to wider application among other Indian governments. During off-peak hours or off-peak seasons, access to facilities could also be made available to Indians. Here, we have in mind such facilities as computers, recreation complexes (for Bands situated near a post-secondary campus), and media production equipment and studios. One of the attractive features of calling upon the universities and colleges in this way is that there is a double multiplier effect. Firstly, faculty members can often, in turn, mobilize other resources such as graduate students or students doing a practicum. Secondly, benefits realized by one Indian government could be passed along to other Indian governments.

Such relationships by no means need involve a unidirectional flow of benefits from academia to Indians. Such experiences will often provide not only much-valued publication opportunities to individual faculty members, but also many learning experiences for them as well. Furthermore, the very fact that it is involved in such service activities gives any university or college a significant boost in legitimacy in the eyes of government funders. There are also more tangible benefits which the education institutions or the individual faculty member participating on a project can derive from a working relationship with an Indian government. For instance, the Indian government might reciprocate by providing guest lecturers in university or college courses, by inviting project participants to cultural festivals such as pow-wows, by extending fishing privileges to project members on a "university appreciation weekend", or by making available facilities of their own for occasional academic retreats by small groups of faculty members.

Finally, we wish to make it clear that we harbour no illusions as to universities and colleges being a panacea to the problems of implementing Indian self-government. Relationships with universities will involve mutual benefit and mutual learning, and some of that learning will come from making mistakes. However, the universities do constitute a rich stock of human talent and Indians do have pressing needs for such talents. If the capitalist private sector can make a claim on the universities and colleges as training schools for its labour force, and if provincial governments can underwrite the costs of the capitalist private sector's access to universities' computers, surely an Indian claim is at least
as valid.

NOTES

1. For an example of the outcome of such a conflict, see Paul Driben and Robert S. Trudeau, *When Freedom is Lost: The Dark Side of the Relationship Between Government and the Fort Hope Band*, Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1983, Chapter Five.

2. *Annual Reports* of the Alberta Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs.


6. For instance, the Government of Alberta recently contributed $10 million towards the purchase of a new generation "super computer" by the University of Calgary, in exchange for access to that computer by private sector firms such as foreign oil companies, among others.

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