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ABSTRACT/RESUME

Studies of Indian policy in Canada and the United States typically focus on the legislative evolution of federal programmes for native peoples, often ignoring the regional application of those policies. An examination of the development of Indian policy in the Yukon Territory illustrates the need to balance the national perspective with a regional view. Territorial realities interfered with the application of federal initiatives. To compensate for local social and economic conditions, government agents were required to develop policies and programmes more closely attuned to the regional setting.

L'étude de la politique Indienne au Canada et aux États-Unis se concentre typiquement sur l'évolution legislative des programmes federal pour les personnes natives, souvent ignorant l'application regional de ces politiques, et l'examen du développement de la politique Indienne dans le Territoire du Yukon illustre le besoin de balancer la perspective national avec la vue regional. Les realites territoriales interfere avec l'application d'initiatives Federal. Pour compenser pour les conditions sociales et economiques locale, les agents gouvernemental devaient developper des programmes et des politiques plus en accord avec l'etablissement regional.
In his assessment of the current state of historical research on government-Indian relations in the United States of America, Francis Paul Prucha recently argued that too much attention has been paid to the origins of federal programming and too little to the implementation of policy. Studies of Jacksonian Indian strategies, of the General Allottment (or Dawes) Act of 1887, and of John Collier's Indian "New Deal" prepared in the 1930's have discussed, often with great success, the impact of prevailing public attitudes on government programming. Unfortunately, most stop short of tracing national policy changes to the level of implementation. As a consequence, historians still know very little about the regional application of federal Indian policy. As Prucha has pointed out (1981)

Historical research in the administration of public policy entails two elements. There is first the formulation and determination of the policy, the definite course or method of action which guides and determines present and future decisions. Then there is the administrative evolution of the policy. Neither of these can be studied effectively without the other, for a policy can be fully understood only by watching it unfold in practice.

Prucha's critique for the United States applies with even greater validity to Canada. Commentators on the administration of Indian policy in Canada (and there have been distressingly few) typically have sketched the broad contours of federal legislation relating to Indians. The consistently superficial analysis employed in these studies, often laced with critical assessments of the paternalism and colonialism inherent in the Indian Act, has resulted in a general characterization of national Indian policy as unwavering, highly centralized and goal-oriented. Indian agents charged with the administration of the programmes are described by implication as adhering without question to Ottawa policies.

The cause of this widespread acceptance of federal policy may lie in the apparent simplicity and rigidity of federal programming. Surveying contemporary Indian affairs, Ponting and Gibbins characterize the central historical tenets of federal policy over the last century as the promotion of native self-sufficiency, protecting the Indians from the evils of white society, encouraging conversion to Christianity, and assimilating the natives (1980:3-30). While some of these goals remained intact into the 1970's, national directives did not necessarily translate into local initiatives. In southern Canada, it is true, reservations, agricultural training programs, and church-administered boarding schools figured prominently in native-government relations and seemed to conform to the assimilationist program entrenched in the Indian Act. In the north, however, dispersed settlement and nomadic patterns made administration difficult, and interfered with the uniform application of national policy. Government actions (and in this sense I refer to the larger bureaucracy and not just to the Department of Indian Affairs) on Indian matters in the Yukon Territory between 1894 and 1950 illustrate the erratic implementation of national policy and in particular the limited application of assimilationist goals. Equally, there is a tendency to limit consideration of federal actions to the central concerns of the
Indian Act. In the Yukon as elsewhere, the government provided a variety of medical and social programs for the Indians. These administrative tasks combined with the consideration of the Indians' future prospects to constitute national native programming and represent the broader scope of government involvement with the country's native population.

With native-government relations dominated by the lack of a negotiated land settlement between the natives and the government, the Yukon situation differed significantly from that faced by treaty Indians. The land allotments, annuity payments and close supervision provided by the treaty system established different conditions than those encountered by non-treaty Indians. The Yukon situation was probably similar to native-government relations in other districts not covered by the treaty umbrella. Importantly, the Yukon experience illustrates that while the policy guidelines entrenched in the Indian Act remained intact, federal authorities acted with surprising flexibility.

The federal government initially refused to acknowledge any obligation for its northern territories, let alone for the native inhabitants. Unlike the south, where treaties were hastily negotiated in order to clear the way for settlement, the government had little desire to extend the treaty system northward. From 1870 to 1896, the Canadian government displayed little interest in the northern reaches of its newly acquired territories. This neglect of the north, interrupted first by the cursory examinations of Geological Survey of Canada personnel in the 1880's, was more forcefully overcome by the intervention of William Carpenter Bompas of the Church Missionary Society. Gravely concerned by the incursions of the rapacious northern mining population, Bompas repeatedly petitioned the government to send a detachment of the North-West Mounted Police to supervise their activities. The federal authorities relented in 1894, though only partially out of concern for the effect of expansion on the Indians.8

Ottawa gave Inspector Constantine, commander of the first Yukon contingent, precise instructions on how to deal with the Indians. As official representative of the Department of Indian Affairs, Constantine was cautioned "not to give encouragement to the idea that they (the Yukon Indians) will be received into treaty, and taken under the care of the government."9 Convinced that the northern district held few prospects for development or settlement, the government felt no need to alienate Indian lands through treaty. Preliminary relief measures were contemplated, but the government wanted it clearly understood that the Indians were to be accorded no better treatment than that offered any Canadian or immigrant.10 The government maintained its policy of negotiating treaties only when native occupied lands were required for permanent development. When such pressures emerged, as in the Mackenzie River valley in 1899-1900, the government did provide benefits such as guaranteed access to game, annuity payments and reservations to compensate for anticipated dislocations (Fumoleau, 1976:30-39). Before 1896, the same concerns were simply not operative in the Yukon. The rapid influx of miners after the discovery of gold in the Klondike, the concentration of mining activity in the west-central Yukon, and the government's conviction that the territory could not sustain permanent development eliminated the need for an agreement.11 In a contradictory fashion...
the possibility that another "Eldorado" lay somewhere in the district similarly dissuaded authorities from alienating any specific land for native use.

The unwillingness of the government to consider a treaty did not end discussion on the matter. Jim Boss, self-styled "hereditary chief of the southern Yukon Indians," submitted a request for land ownership negotiations in 1902. Boss demanded "compensation because of the taking possession of their (the Indians') lands and hunting grounds by the white people." Noting that natives encountering hardship were provided government relief, the federal authorities brushed Boss's claim aside. While individual Indians did not continue to press the issue, the Anglican Church picked up the treaty question. Reverend A.E. O'Meara, financial secretary for the Diocese of the Yukon, prepared a fairly comprehensive treaty claim on behalf of the natives between 1907 and 1910. Reflecting its missionary origins, the claim focused on a request for Anglican-administered day and residential schools in combination with game preserves and community improvement projects. The penultimate proposal also called for the appointment of a full-time Indian Agent, as well as provision for better medical care and official recognition of native marriages.

Before the document reached Frank Oliver, Minister of the Interior, the request for treaty negotiations had been dropped. The clergy had correctly read the government's continued opposition to a land settlement for the Yukon Indians. Responding to the request, Oliver reiterated well-known government policy: "The Government seeks to protect the interests of all, whether Indian or white, but is not responsible for specifically protecting those of the Indian." The Minister rejected the paternalism inherent in expanded government assistance, claiming that it "had been most harmful to the Indians by accentuating their original communism, that is to say, the natural dependance of the Indians upon others." To Oliver, the coming of the whites and the Gold Rush had brought prosperity; acceding to the Indian's request would change native ways and, in his judgement, they would "if left as Indians earn a better living."

The government made it clear, first in 1894 and again in 1910, that conditions in the Yukon precluded the need for federal-native land negotiations. (The signing of Treaty #9 with the Indians of the upper Mackenzie River basin brought a number of Yukon Indians under treaty, The inclusion of the Liard Indians, due solely to the configuration of the Mackenzie drainage basin, hardly constituted a deliberate recognition of aboriginal title in the territory or a deviation from past policy.) The Anglican clergy continued their interventions on behalf of their native charges, but they abandoned the treaty concept. After their attempt in 1909-1910, no significant effort was made for more than half a century to secure a comprehensive settlement with the government.

Throughout these preliminary discussions on the issue, the Yukon Indians had remained notably silent. They were not without advocates, however, as Anglican clergy frequently intervened with the government on their behalf. As Commissioner F. Congdon remarked in 1903, instead of teaching the Indians self-reliance and independence, they (Anglican missionaries) aid most strongly in making them
mendicants. I am daily in receipt of letters from Indians written by a missionary, asking for all sorts of favours. 19

While appeals by natives on their own behalf were few, there were several requests for title to specific tracts of land on the basis of traditional occupation. In 1900 Jim Boss asked for a parcel of land on Lake Laberge, arguing that it "has been occupied by his people from time immemorial."20 In 1933, Joe Squam, "chief" of the Teslin Indians, similarly claimed lands in the Wolf Lake region on the basis that he had "hunted and trapped over this ground since a child."21 In both instances, the individual actions resented on a desire for personal gain, not on assertion of broader native claim. Boss's representation, however, was successful and the government allocated a small reserve. Squam's claims met with a hasty rejection. More generally, the Indians did not hesitate to defend their interests, but they seldom based their appeals to government on inherent right of occupation. Protests over game laws or inappropriate government regulations focused on economic hardship, not aboriginal title to land or resources.22 That the natives did not systematically defend their right to game does not indicate lack of interest. Rather, it suggests that the natives continued to live off the land and that they were confident that the largely unchallenged occupation would continue.

The government's main goal, illustrated in Oliver's comments, centred on maintaining the Indians in their now "traditional" role as hunters and trappers. From 1894 to 1950, there was little commitment to assimilation, except as a far distant goal unlikely to be accomplished. Instead, the federal authorities remained determined to preserve the "Indian way." To this end the government felt it had to keep the Indians from the questionable benefits of the mining industry and socially segregated from the depredations of an inherently avaricious white population. Instead of highlighting its assimilationist goals, the government emphasized the need to protect the Indians from destruction. In many ways (as J. Chamberlin has asserted), protection and assimilation were contradictory goals:

From its initial promulgation (the Indian Act of 1876), there have been those who have questioned the sanity of a piece of legislation which actively discouraged, and indeed in some areas positively prohibited, the assimilation of the Indian into the social and economic life of the non-native population, while at the same time being the centrepiece of a broad policy of moving the Indians towards full citizenship and full participation in Canadian life. By existing to regulate and systematize the relationship between the Indian and the majority society, the (Indian) Act codifies and often exaggerates the distinctions which it is its function eventually to eliminate (Chamberlin, 1975:90).

In the Yukon, the government followed the preferred national option: protection. Their choice was to leave the Indians as harvesters of game. Two policies,
that of residential reservations and that of preservation of access to game, served as the practical, regional manifestations of this larger program.

The desire for a mechanism for social segregation first surfaced in 1896 with the commencement of the Klondike Gold Rush. William Bompas requested a small reserve near Dawson City to keep his native communicants separated from the miners. Despite the contrary judgements of N.W.M.P. Inspector Constantine and Territorial Commissioner William Ogilvie, the Department of Indian Affairs eventually allocated a small plot of land. The 160 acre parcel was located three miles downstream from Dawson City, not as far away as Constantine and Ogilvie wished, but removed from the centre of white population. Further debate over this reserve illustrated the limited importance accorded to the affairs of Indians, in the face of potential northern development. Repeated requests for an extension of the plot were rejected on the basis of Ogilvie's representation that "discoveries of gold have been made in that vicinity, and before I recommend any extension of the 160 acres, I will await the development of this ground, as gold mining ground."23

The federal government enacted such a process of residential reserve allocation whenever lands were subjected to development pressure or natives moved too close to a white community. When ore containing lead and silver was discovered near Mayo in 1915, several Indians moved into the town, attracted by perceived opportunities. The government quickly laid out a native residential reserve 2½ miles downstream from the new community - and on the opposite side of the river. The Mayo reserve met both of the government's criteria, removing the Indians from potentially valuable land and protecting the natives from white influence. Over the following years, Indian Agent John Hawksley lauded the positive results of the transfer.25 Securing such a reserve did not guarantee permanence. If whites demanded access to lands granted to the natives, the government arranged a hasty transfer of the Indian reserve. In the Whitehorse area, for example, the government shifted the reserve four times between 1915 and 1921.26 While government self-interest determined many reserve allotments, federal authorities occasionally permitted native needs to govern the location of reserves. In 1898 at Tagish27 and again at Little Salmon in 1915, the government preserved native lands from white encroachment. As the federal surveyor responsible for laying out the Little Salmon parcel noted, however, "It is a matter of record that the Indians have not made any request for this reserve.28 The Yukon situation paralleled experience elsewhere in Canada. Native reserves were constantly subject to white encroachment and relocation. The distinct nature of the Yukon experience lay in the use of residential reserves, small parcels of land destined to serve as little more than a site for seasonal homes. In the south, where hope remained that the Indians would become agriculturalists, the natives received larger reserves.

Throughout the territory the government applied the residential reserve concept, typically according to the Mayo plan. In addition to the Dawson, Mayo, Little Salmon and Whitehorse allotments, the federal government established reserves at Carcross, Teslin, Selkirk, Carmacks and Old Crow. The government's attempt to encourage native settlement on lands removed from
centres of white population served as an integral part of a larger plan. Founded on the belief that the future of the nomadic hunting Indians lay in the preservation of their "natural" state, the plan served to enhance social distance between natives and whites and to keep the Indians on the fringes of the industrial economy.29

Government policy to restrict Indian access to white social and economic activities served little purpose, however, without an alternative. The second component of the federal government’s strategy, that of preserving native access to game, provided the desired substitute. Almost all missionaries, R.C.M.P. officers, and government officials despised the Indians accepting "civilization." Most observers accepted that the Indians had to hunt and fish in order to survive. Thus native access to game resources had to be assured. Accomplishing this goal proved relatively easy, for few whites competed for the game stocks. Nonetheless, grave concern persisted about the prospect of this situation holding true over the longer term. Market hunters in the Dawson and Mayo areas competed aggressively with the Indians, and the decline of game in these areas portended the threat of a wide-scale depletion.

While most officials could agree on the need to preserve native access to game, finding practical means to implement these desires proved difficult. As evident in the case of residential reserves, native rights were seldom accorded a place of high priority within the larger government establishment, which frequently gave way to pragmatic concerns for future development. The parenthetical attention given the matter aided the natives' interest in the short term. Limited white settlement and restricted mining activity left the Indians substantially unchallenged in their harvesting pursuits. Several proposals were brought forward to entrench this native-land relationship, including Acting Commissioner Lithgow’s 1907 suggestion that all the natives in the territory be removed to the Peel-Porcupine district, an area believed devoid of mineral resources.30 Not until the 1930’s, when increased hunting pressure tied to an improving fur market threatened game resources, did suggestions for native-only game preserves receive serious consideration. Preserves had been adopted, allegedly with success, for the Indians in the Mackenzie valley. Again, however, the government hesitated to countenance such a proposal for the mineral-rich Yukon.31 A proposal for large-scale game reserves first emerged for the Yukon in 1955. Harper Reed, Indian Agent for the Stikine district in northern British Columbia, requested that the Department of Indian Affairs take action to protect natives in the Upper Liard district from the perceived effects of white encroachment.52 Although R.C.M.P. reports failed to substantiate Reed’s claims of over-trapping, his proposal foundered on other grounds. Charles Camsell, noted northern surveyor and then Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines, made federal priorities for the Yukon abundantly clear when he noted

If we are not going to reserve our northern regions exclusively for the use of the natives but are looking to encourage the opening up of these regions to the people of Canada generally, then I think we must limit the extent of the preserves to meet the pressing needs of the natives but no more.33
Development - not native access to game - was to take precedence in the Yukon.

The federal government approached the question of Indian access to game in a contradictory fashion. When several white trappers began exploiting the Old Crow flats muskrat stocks in 1929 and when whites began to compete for fish and fur resources in the Little Atlin district in 1932, government agents moved quickly to protect native interests.34 There were, however, clear limits to the level of intervention. The government maintained a solid commitment to protect native hunting and fishing pursuits but recoiled at any suggestion that those rights be entrenched through game preserves or special hunting regulations.

The government's ambivalence finally succumbed to changing conditions and attitudes. Continued white hunting pressure, particularly during the construction of the Alaska Highway in 1942-1943, led to increased concern for the future of native hunting. In 1947, Indian Agent R.J. Meek requested the implementation of registered traplines, a program used to good effect in northern British Columbia. Under Meek's plan, the natives had first claim to trapping territories, with half-breeds and "old-timers" making their choice before the allocation of the remainder of the traplines.35 Implemented by the territorial government in 1950, the registration program unfortunately came into effect at precisely the moment when there began a prolonged downward spiral in fur prices, which drained much of the vitality from the trade. Trapline permits were clearly a second-best option compared to proposals for native-only game preserves; up to 1950, however, they represented the limits of federal munificence.36

Federal authorities, seconded by the territorial administration, consistently supported the concept of leaving the Indians as hunters and trappers. The imperative nature of northern development policy, however, interfered with a logical application of the preferred program. By definition, the Yukon served as a national resource base for the rest of the country. The government could not countenance entrenchment of native access to game which, in turn, promised to interfere with northern development. Indian interests were regularly subordinated to a more pressing national concern for economic development. In the Yukon, native access to game even had to give way to sport hunting, which was slowly being recognized as a potential growth industry. As R.H. Gibson noted,

There has always been a fundamental difference in wild life management of the Yukon and the Northwest Territories. In the Yukon Territory hunting for sport has been encouraged. In the Northwest Territories the wild life is reserved for those who depend on it for a living, chiefly our increasing population of Indians and Eskimos.37

As of 1950, most of the Yukon Indians remained hunters and trappers, resorting to the towns only as season and need dictated. While the government's
program of economic and social segregation seemed to have worked, more important forces actually worked to keep natives and whites apart. Rather than government encouragement, it was limited mining development, restricted demographic pressure, a consistently strong fur market, and the natives’ preference for harvesting over industrial work, that ensured that the Indians remained as Indians. The government had, it seems, succeeded in spite of itself, its programs of residential reserves and economic segregation serving more as symbols than as effective policies. To a certain extent, then, government programming for the Yukon natives seldom extended beyond an acceptance of the status quo. Importantly, and only to the extent possible within its limited mandate, the Department of Indian Affairs attempted to solidify and entrench the Indians’ position through government initiative.

Federal government programming for the Yukon Indians had strayed significantly from the national imperatives delineated in the Indian Act. The encouragement of self-sufficiency and the provision of protection from white society are evident in the programs discussed above. The government, however, shied away from a commitment to assimilation, which was allegedly the cornerstone of national Indian policy. The ready acceptance of "best left as Indians" from 1894 to 1950 stands in marked contrast to the cultural imperialism typically associated with federal Indian policy. This contradiction may have been inherent in the government’s program, as the dedication to protection and self-sufficiency almost by definition interfered with attempts at assimilation. The guidelines in the Indian Act, however, also allowed for a certain flexibility, permitting government agents both in the field and in Ottawa to adapt national policy directives to local conditions. Given the limited development prospects for the territory and substantial socio-cultural barriers (both native and white) to Indian participation in the industrial economy, the government’s acceptance of the natives as hunters and trappers was no doubt the most logical, and cost-effective, program. The administration of Indian affairs in the Yukon did not focus exclusively on these larger policy directives; indeed, attempts at structuring residential reserves and preserving native access to game evolved as ad hoc responses to changing territorial conditions.

Government agents charged with supervising the Indians actually spend most of their time and the majority of their fiscal allotments on more mundane matters, especially on emergency relief and medical care for those who slipped below the margins of subsistence or of basic good health. Federal involvement, which fell outside the government’s legal requirements, as the natives were not covered by a treaty, centred on one simple principle. Leaving aside Frank Oliver’s comments that white expansion had been of unqualified benefit, the bureaucracy acknowledged that the arrival of the whites had been at best a mixed blessing. Through the introduction of new diseases and over-harvesting of resources, the whites had inflicted an array of social and economic ills upon the Indian population. Intervention in the areas of welfare and medical assistance started with an unwritten but widely accepted commitment to compensate those Indians displaced or injured by white advancement. It is at this level that understanding of the administration of Indian Affairs in Canada is
most deficient. In a recent study of the North, Peter Usher commented, "The government had sought to remove any encumbrance to land title and settlement and the police maintained law and order. Beyond these measures, however, the government failed to detect any responsibility on its part for those people over whose territories it had assumed control." (Usher, 1982:427). While Usher's comment may apply to some northern districts, it is most certainly an inadequate representation of conditions in the Yukon.

Government involvement with such Indian matters commenced with the arrival of the North-West Mounted Police in 1894. Though Inspector Constantine was enjoined from encouraging treaty negotiations, as the official representative of the Department of Indian Affairs, he received authorization to provide necessary medical and relief assistance. With the establishment of the Yukon Territory as an administrative unit in 1898, many of the fiscal responsibilities passed to the office of the Commissioner, although police officers in the field continued to provide the actual aid. Following repeated representations by the Anglican Church, the government finally relented from its de facto policy and appointed a full-time Indian Agent. Long-time Yukon missionary John Hawksley received the posting. Hawksley treated his new position as an extension of his former duties, paying particular attention to the Indians' moral state and medical condition. Far from being an interventionist, the new agent believed his greatest claim was that "The Indians feel they have a place to go when they are in trouble where they can be advised and helped; they appreciate it very much." Following Hawksley's retirement in 1953, the duties of the Indian Agent passed back to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Each year, one officer was delegated responsibility for territorial Indian matters, in addition to other assigned duties. Clearly, the limited priority given native affairs had slipped even further. From 1914 to 1946, the office of the Indian Agent served as little more than an administrative centre, dispensing relief, organizing medical and educational programs and reporting regularly to the Ottawa office. When R.J. Meek received an appointment as a full-time agent in 1946, the position took on greater importance, largely due to Meek's initiative (McCandless, 1985). From Constantine to Meek, however, individuals responsible for the administration of Indian Affairs found themselves preoccupied with compensating the Indians for the ravages associated with white expansion.

Relief, or welfare, has long been the government program most readily associated with Indians. A myth developed in the 1900-1950 period, and persists today, concerning the natives' reaction to the availability of relief. The standard account is that the Indians readily surrendered to the convenience of government assistance, abandoning more rigorous pursuits in favour of supplication at the Indian Agent's table. Those administering the relief program in the territory almost universally shared this belief, and their attitudes played a major role in shaping the program. As the Yukon experience demonstrates, that image was a misleading portrayal of native interest in government handouts.

Federal authorities initially refused to accept any obligation for native suffering, doggedly maintaining that the arrival of the white man had been of considerable benefit to the Indians. Faced with the potential starvation of a small band of Indians at Moosehide in 1900, the government finally acted.
N.W.M.P. Inspector Z. Wood of Dawson authorized immediate distribution of food to alleviate the crisis, only applying for official permission after the fact. The government insisted that "whenever possible the Indians should be required to perform labour or supply game, skins or other commodities in return for the provisions issued to them." In the short term, however, police officers were enjoined to "provide against anything like destitution.

From 1900 onward, the government provided parsimonious relief assistance to those truly in need. Few took up the offer, however limiting the welfare rolls to a small number of widowed, aged or infirm natives. The relief system was occasionally required to respond to more widespread destitution, as occurred in 1905 near McQuesten and 1912 in the southern Yukon, when game stocks unexpectedly proved insufficient. While few came forward to claim these fruits of the government's munificence, the police officials in charge of the program before 1914 believed that the availability of relief rendered the Indians graceless supplicants. As the Commanding Officer of the Whitehorse Detachment commented in 1908, "It is evident that the government assistance given to sick and destitute Indians at Whitehorse is most injurious to the well being and morale of the Indians." He then proceeded to ascribe alcohol abuse, prostitution and general laziness to the "pernicious effect" of relief. As a counter-measure, the police imposed controlling mechanisms to protect against abuse. Inspector Horrigan noted in 1912 that "young husky Indians asking for provisions were asked to split some stove wood. Needless to say in every case they found that after all they did not require provisions. This plan has worked admirably in weeding out the undeserving cases."

Under Hawksley, the relief program expanded considerably. The new Indian Agent relied on his former missionary colleagues to assist him, also allowing police officers and even fur traders to allocate supplies when deemed necessary. Even with the expanded networks, there are no indications that the natives found the relief system desirable. Facing the rigorous government strictures on assistance, only the truly destitute applied for aid. The Indians were hardly different from those few whites whose sustenance depended upon wild game. When resources played out or grubstakes dwindled, white trappers and prospectors similarly fell back on meager government handouts. Sustained by a viable, remunerative hunting and trapping economy and facing little pressure to abandon their nomadic pursuits, the Indians found little attraction in eking out a marginal existence on the social and physical fringes of white communities. The relief system did provide an important safety net for times when other means of support had failed. In offering such aid, the government hardly assumed a great responsibility; they did, nonetheless, recognize their obligation to compensate those who suffered through white incursions. This willingness to assist the Indians was not a declared national objective. Instead, as with much of the government activity on behalf of the natives, federal authorities responded to local exigencies. In these administrative areas, as with broader policy concerns, regional realities conditioned the scope and the sub-
stance of federal Indian programming.

While few natives appear to have suffered significant economic distress, many more felt the ravages of European diseases (easily a majority of those on relief accepted aid due to illness). Through a desire to compensate Indians for the depredations of white society, the government provided a surprisingly comprehensive medical care program. N.W.M.P. surgeons offered assistance to natives whenever medical needs dictated. By 1906, the government had replaced the ad hoc reliance on police personnel with a more permanent system. The Department of Indian Affairs placed four doctors on permanent retainer. The doctors then made their services available to Indians as required. When authorized by the appropriate government official, Indians could visit the doctor, receive free medication and other aids, and even be hospitalized without charge. 50

The federal government's commitment to medical care became particularly evident during outbreaks of epidemic disease. From the 1840's virgin soil epidemics (illnesses to which the natives had no natural immunity)51 had repeatedly struck the Yukon Indians. Recognizing these diseases as white imports, the government moved swiftly to prevent or limit the devastation typically associated with the attacks. As with most government programs for the Indians, other considerations conditioned government response. Diseases carried by the nomadic Indians threatened the sedentary white population, and it served everyone's interest to prevent the dispersal of illness. Containing the epidemics in the Indian camps functioned as an important form of preventive medicine for the rest of the territory. Though motives may have been mixed, the government did respond quickly to each appearance of a potential epidemic. Quarantines served to limit the spread of the disease and grants of food rations and medical care assisted those under surveillance. This system, imposed repeatedly throughout the territory, worked in combination with regular medical attendance to provide the Yukon Indians with a surprisingly comprehensive medical care system. 52 These relief and medical care provisions deviated from the central tenets of government Indian policy. They were designed primarily as compensation, as repayment for damages inflicted by white expansion, and did not represent an attempt to "improve" the Indians.

Education stood in stark contrast to these ad hoc measures, offering a seemingly deliberate attempt to reshape and undermine native culture. Recent studies of native education in the Canada and the United States have defined church and government schooling as mediums of "cultural imperialism" (Carnoy, 1974; Altbach and Kelly, 1978). More than any other branch of government programming, education was designed to eliminate remaining vestiges of tribalism, paganism and backwardness. It was through education that governments in Canada, the United States and elsewhere undertook to transform indigenous, colonized societies into copies of the European model. The appearance in southern Canada of industrial and boarding schools, plus a widespread network of reserve day schools, suggests that the government used this potentially powerful institution as an organ of assimilation. The emphasis on Christianity (schools were run by missionaries), industrial skills, work discipline,
and basic citizenship combined with a ready deprecation of native talents, served to hasten the destruction of Indian culture and its replacement with "Canadian" values and attitudes (Gresko, 1981:37-45). While this characterization may reflect conditions in southern centres, it does not adequately describe the role of Indian education in the Yukon.

The federal government placed very little value on the educational offerings of the churches providing money for the schools primarily to neutralize potential church objections. The Anglican church held responsibility for native education in the territory, operating several seasonal day schools and the residential facility at Carcross. The day schools in particular attracted little government confidence. The irregular program, offered only when the Indians resided near a church mission, was taught by teachers of widely varying talent. Through the 1920's, and 1930's, most of the teachers were students on summer leave from the Anglican School of Theology in Vancouver. Their unquestioned enthusiasm could not compensate for their lack of knowledge of local conditions and their inability to converse in native languages. Justifying the federal government's limited interest in day schools, Indian Agent Hawksley commented in 1933:

The Indians, owing to changed circumstances, cannot afford to stay around the villages or leave their families while the men go away to hunt and trap, they are compelled to separate into small parties and live in the woods for the purpose of hunting and trapping in order to make a living. Opportunities of obtaining work from white people are very much reduced. To insist upon the Indian families staying in the village (which has been suggested) would mean that some of them would have to receive help in the way of provisions. It appears to be a much wiser policy to keep them independent, earning their own living, and they are less liable to get into bad habits.\(^5\)

Given the choice between education and self-sufficiency, the government clearly favoured the latter. Not until 1945 did the federal government place any importance on the day school program. The provision of minimal funding served more as an indirect subsidy to the Anglican missions than as an attempt at assimilation.

While the seasonal day schools were clearly deficient operations, the Carcross Residential School offered better prospects. Boarding schools are typically, and appropriately, portrayed as the ultimate form of cultural imperialism (Albach and Kelly, 1978; Fuchs and Havighurst, 1973; Szasz, 1974). Children were removed from their parents at a young age and separated through their formative years from the influence of their tribal culture. A total institution designed to recast all aspects of the young minds placed under its care, the boarding school served as one means by which the assimilationist aspirations of government and church could be realized. The federal government clearly had such goals in mind when the industrial-boarding school pro-
gram expanded westward in the late 19th Century. By the time the Carcross facility opened in 1911, however, government and church attitudes had changed significantly. Many of those involved acknowledged that the industrial school concept in particular had failed, offering the students unusable skills, raising false expectations and preparing the children inadequately for life after school. As early as 1906, the Special Indian Committee of the Missionary Society of the Church of England in Canada recommended that educational offerings be limited to basic literacy, elementary computational skills, and "such additional work as will fit the child to take his place as workman in the locality in which he is to live." The federal government, especially top-ranking Department of Interior official Frank Pedley and his minister Frank Oliver, shared these opinions. Both men encouraged a less structured boarding school curriculum. Oliver went even further, wondering on several occasions whether the boarding school format was of any utility.

The Carcross school administrators unsuccessfully attempted to overcome the contradictions inherent in their program. The educational package centred on offering vocational training as would "be useful and profitable to them in after life." Recognizing the limited prospects for industrial development in the region, the teachers taught the boys to hunt and fish and provided basic handyman skills. In addition to domestic work around the school, girls were encouraged to learn beadwork and other "profitable" skills. While accepting the limitations on their educational offerings, these Christian teachers would not forego their religious mission. They made systematic efforts to encourage the moral and spiritual "improvement" of the native children, even if it meant the equally systematic depreciation of Indian values and beliefs. Special emphasis was placed on hygiene, work discipline, manners, and Christian morality. The main legacy of the school lay in one fundamental contradiction. In the occupational domain, student training focused on skills essential for survival after return to the hunting and fishing camps. At the same time, the moral and spiritual teachings of the school taught the children to abhor the culture and values of the villages to which they were returning. The inconsistency of the residential school program would cause major difficulties for the students upon re-entry into native society. Ironically, the program designed with the limited aim of making them "better Indians" only served to turn them into marginal people, caught between a native lifestyle they had learned to disdain and a white society unprepared to accept them.

Education is typically viewed as the centre-piece of government attempts to civilize and assimilate the Indians of Canada. The cultural imperialism of these Yukon institutions emerged in the missionaries' effort to undermine native culture, morals, and work habits. Importantly, the federal government placed little value on these undertakings, providing funding primarily for fear of political repercussions should the Anglican Church be denied assistance. Again, however, the standard that dominated educational programming in the Yukon was "best left as Indians." The government would not encourage, let alone force, the natives to abandon nomadic patterns in order just to improve accessibility to schools. The desire to prepare the children adequately for life in the hunting and fishing camps even dominated the Carcross Residential School
program. While the church's efforts to reform native cultural and social values should not be underestimated, it is clear that even in the field of education the government had not deviated from its intention of leaving the Indians in the bush.

To the end of World War II, the federal government's program for the Yukon Indians departed in several significant respects from declared national policy. Many of the elements laid out in the Indian Act, including the encouragement of self-sufficiency, the protection of the natives from white society, and support for the Christianization of the "heathens", found their way into Yukon practice, albeit often by default. In contrast, there was no commitment to assimilation. The authorities remained dedicated to keeping the Indians as Indians, supporting their continuing desire to hunt and trap and working to avoid their absorption into the unreliable industrial economy. The low priority ascribed to Indian matters by the federal government prevented any entrenchment of this position in the form of game preserves or guaranteed access to game, but the emphasis remained intact. While the government shied away from imposing its assimilationist model on the Yukon Indians, they did offer compensation to overcome the difficulties attending white expansion. Somewhat surprisingly, the medical and welfare benefits available to the natives began well in advance of government programs for other Canadians, a faint but nonetheless clear precursor of the safety net provisions of the post World War II welfare state.

After World War II, federal programming with regard to Yukon Indians took a dramatic shift, ushering in a new era of government-native programming. While the administration of native affairs before 1945 resulted from a pessimistic assessment of territorial prospects, the striking increase in interventionism after that date was tied to new national imperatives. The post-war commitment of the Mackenzie King's Liberal administration to a national social welfare system foreshadowed major new directions in government programming for all Canadians (Guest, 1980; Coates, 1982). While much of the increased intervention stemmed from national policies, including the Mothers' Allowance introduced in 1944, other programs originated more particularly from recognition of changing conditions in the Yukon, such as the construction of the Alaska Highway and Canol Pipeline during the war, and a precipitous decline in fur prices after 1948.

Much of the "new" policy involved an expansion of existing programs. This period saw the extension of medical care offerings outside the Dawson-Whitehorse corridor, a tuberculosis survey, a special tuberculosis wing addition to the Whitehorse General Hospital, the hiring of a Public Health nurse to administer routine medical services and offer health education, an immunization programme and special dental clinics. The government also fleshed out relief measures, particularly in the aftermath of the collapse of the fur trade. Indian Agent R.J. Meek tried to divert the natives from the welfare rolls, instead "assisting the Indians to be self-supporting and reliant". Whenever possible, according to Meek, financial aid was "given to Indians to assist them in possible worthwhile fields of endeavour, in preference to direct relief." As before, the myriad medical and welfare programs available to Indians far exceeded those
provided to the white population.

The program of greatest impact in the 1945-1950 period was the Mothers' Allowance. To qualify for the monthly allotments, one had only had to be a resident of Canada with children under the age of 16 registered in and attending school. However, the inadequate day school system, coupled with the refusal of most territorial public schools to accept native students, eliminated the immediate need for the Indians to fulfill the education requirement. Afraid that the Indians' nomadic lifestyle would lead to profligate waste of the federal grant, the government insisted upon issuing the payments "in kind." Offering food and clothing instead of a cheque allowed the government to dictate native purchases. Seeing little of value in native eating habits, the authorities insisted that canned milk and tomatoes and prepared baby foods be included in individual allotments.59 The program had other, even greater significance than the important alterations it dictated in diet and material culture. The requirement that children attend schools, applied with increasing vigour with the passage of time (beginning in the early 1950's), forced difficult choices between seasonal mobility and a more sedentary existence calculated to ensure a continuity of payments. The government expanded the day school and residential school programs in the same period, drawing more children into its educational network and more families into permanent settlement near the towns.60

The federal government had embarked on a new direction in social programming after 1945, not just for Indians but for all Canadians. For the Yukon Indians, this increased activity had marked consequences. Mothers' Allowance, pensions for the aged, educational support, employment programs, expanded welfare and medical care offered a greatly enhanced level of government support. Through the 1950's and following decades, government intervention increased, as the federal bureaucracy sought new ways to "improve" the natives' condition. For the Yukon Indians, it was only after 1945 that the federal government's native policy approached the interventionist-assimilationist program long believed to typify government-native relations. 61

The Yukon example illustrates how declared public policy goals can be transformed in the process of becoming administrative practice. The national commitment to protection and assimilation remained intact well past 1950, but in the hands of national bureaucrats and Indian Agents sensitive to local conditions, the imperatives of federal legislation were not applied with unwavering conviction and were altered significantly over time. Paradoxically, federal involvement in the Yukon was both more active and less interventionist than is typically suggested. Accepting an unwritten obligation to compensate the Indians for the impact of white expansion, the government offered relief and medical care far in advance of that available to white residents. Simultaneously, however, the Department of Indian Affairs shied away from a policy of direct assimilation of the natives. The policy of "best left as Indians" dominated through the 1940's. The allotment of residential reserves and preferential game regulations represented a conscious attempt to encourage the social and economic segregation of native and white, and hence preserve the "native way."
The federal government's non-intervention in this crucial sphere does not indicate a commitment to the viability of the native society. Yukon realities simply interfered with the logical application of a national program. The low priority ascribed to native affairs ensured that the government refrained from entrenching the policy of segregation through the establishment of game preserves. Potential development, and not native access to game, remained a principal consideration of the government (as opposed to the Department of Indian Affairs'). The federal authorities repeatedly fended off requests to guarantee Indian hunting and trapping rights in order to protect the territory for tourist hunting and mineral development. Self-interest also had a more immediate dimension. Retaining the Indians on reserves and providing for their advancement toward Canadian society required money, as the treatment of the southern Indians had demonstrated. Allowing the Indians to sustain themselves through harvesting provided a cost-effective means of looking after their interests, even if it required the abrogation, or at best postponement, of declared government assimilationist policy. While the government's motives were suspect, or at best contradictory, the bureaucrats involved with territorial and Indian matters nonetheless adhered to their program of leaving the Indians as hunters and trappers.

The national commitment to social programming regulated the level of federal involvement in Indian Affairs in the Yukon Territory. However, the non-interventionist ethos of pre-World War II government policy-makers did not prevent federal authorities from authorizing a welfare and medical program for the Yukon natives, decades in advance of similar offerings for white citizens. Importantly, even after the government expanded its national offerings after 1945, the Indians continued to receive a higher level of assistance. Dental clinics, expanded medical care, improved educational facilities and work initiatives signalled the government's intention to assist those people perceived to be in greatest need. Not until 1945 was the national dedication to assimilation pursued with the singlemindedness ascribed to the broader sweep of federal-Indian relations. Not until then did federal financial resources and government attitudes combine to provide the requisite resources for a program much discussed but, for the Yukon Indians at least, never before implemented.

The policy guidelines outlined in the Indian Act provided a framework within which government-Indian relations functioned. Importantly, regional and national administrators enjoyed considerable freedom in relating national imperatives to local conditions. Of the four main elements of national Indian policy, the encouragement of self-sufficiency (but importantly in non-agricultural pursuits) and protecting the natives from the white population dominated Yukon programming. Setting up residential reserves (as opposed to negotiated treaty reserves) and protecting access to resources (but not going so far as to grant game preserves) were the central tenets of Indian Affairs' administration in the territory. Although native needs were constantly subordinated to the pressing government concern for development, limited mining activity precluded any significant conflict over access to land. The government avoided assimilation, altering its educational program and expectations considerably and
doggedly asserting as late as 1950 that the hunting and trapping life offered the best prospects for the Indians. For their part, the natives agreed with the government's position. The vast majority continued to prefer the still-economical pursuit of game over the meagre returns from government hand-outs. The Yukon example illustrates both that territorial policy deviated from accepted national norms and, of equal importance, that federal programming did not remain consistent with the concepts embodied in the Indian Act.

NOTES

1. The author would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of Dr. David Breen and Dr. R.A.J. McDonald, University of British Columbia, and Dr. Dennis Essar, Brandon University.


3. There are, of course, exceptions. Ronald Satz (1975) is perhaps the best. Graham Taylor (1980), Roy Meyer (1967), and Kenneth Philip (1981) have also contributed.


To provide but one example, see J. Gresko, "White 'Rites' and Indian 'Rites': Indian Education and Native Responses in the West, 1870-1910," in A.W. Rasporich, ed., *Western Canada: Past and Present* (Calgary: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 163-182.


8. John Tobias, "Canada's Subjugation of the Plains Cree" *Canadian Historical*
Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1983), 519-548. On government activities in the north, see Morris Zaslow, Reading the Rocks: The Story of the Geological Survey of Canada, 1842-1972 (Ottawa: Macmillan of Canada, 1975); Morris Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870-1914 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 77-100. For Bompas's petitions, see Deputy Superintendent General to Hon. T. Mayne Daly, 18 September 1893, Department of Indian Affairs, RG10 (hereafter DIA), Vol. 3906, file 105,378, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC); Bompas to Dear Sir, 26 August 1893, ibid.; Bompas to Minister of the Interior, 5 June 1894, ibid., Native Races and Liquor Traffic, United Committee to Hon. Sir Charles Tupper, 1894, ibid.; Bompas to Church Missionary Society, 15 May 1894, Church Missionary Society Papers (CMS), MG17, B2, PAC. See also A.A. Wright, Prelude to Bonanza (Sidney: Gray's Publishing, 1976), 256-271. Concern for the Indians was secondary to the government's desire to assert Canadian sovereignty in the face of American incursion and to collect customs duties on resources being exported from the district.


11. Ian Clarke, "Clifford Sifton in Relation to His Mines," unpublished paper presented to the Canadian Historical Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, June 1980; David Hall, Clifford Sifton: The Young Napolean (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982).


13. J.D. McLean to Jackson, 28 January 1902, ibid.; Congdon to Sifton, 10 September 1904, ibid.; Asst. Secretary. Memorandum to Mr. Pedley, 19 October 1904, ibid.

14. Memo for the Minister re: Yukon Indians, c.1907, AC, New Series, file 2; Pedley to Oliver, 25 January 1908, AC, Carcross Property file; Notes made from interview with Reverend A.M. O'Meara re: Indians in the Yukon, 1908, ibid.; Indian Matters: Recommendations of Messrs. Hawksley and O'Meara, 1908, ibid.; Memo for Archbishop regarding Yukon Indian work, 1908, ibid.

16. Notes of interview with Mr. Pedley and Mr. Oliver, 26 February 1909, AC, New Series, file 2.

17. See Fumoleau, *As Long As This Land Shall Last*, 150-215. For a brief statement on the treaty issue in the Yukon, see "Land Entitlement of Indians of the Yukon and N.W.T." by Col. H.M. Jones, Director, Indian Affairs Branch, Active Files, Indian Affairs Branch (IAB), Hull, Quebec, file 801/30-0-1.


20. Miller to Ogilvie, 10 April 1900, RG91, Vol. 7, file 1531, PAC; Commissioner to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 1 May 1900, ibid. Boss's request originated in a personal desire for access to the land in question. By 1917, he was the only native even vaguely connected with the property. When a shipping company cut wood on the land for its vessels, Boss demanded - and received - personal compensation. Miller to Comptroller, Mines, Lands and Yukon Branch, 14 May 1917, Yukon Government Records (YRG) 1, Series 5, Vol. 1, file 1298; McLean to Rowatt, 10 March 1917, ibid.; Miller to Comptroller, 6 February 1917, ibid.

21. Squam to Indian Department, 22 August 1922, DIA, Vol. 6761, file 420-21. Like Boss, Squam's claim to "chief" status was highly debatable. The request was given only cursory attention by the Department of Indian Affairs. Hawksley to Mackenzie, 1 October 1931, RG91, Vol. 9, file 1490, pt. J; Jeckell to Hume, 21 November 1932, YRG1, Series S, Vol. 6, file 12-115.

22. When trapline registration was introduced in 1950, for example, the main native protest was over the annual $10 fee. Meek to Gibson, 27 September 1950. YRG1, Series S. Vol. 11, file 12-2SB; Moses, Tizya and Netro to Meek, 24 July 1950, ibid.; Petition from Chief William Johnson et al, 7 July 1950, ibid.

25. Constantine to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 19 November 1896, IAB, file 801/30-0-1; Extract from William Ogilvie's letter, 8 November 1896, ibid., Constantine to Dear Sir, 13 November 1896, Constantine Letterbook,
Charles Constantine Papers, MG30, E55, PAC; Smart to Bompas, 12 August 1897, AC, New Series, file 4; McLean Memorandum 26 April 1897, IAB, file 801/30-0-1; McGee to Minister of the Interior, 27 March 1900, RG91, Vol. 7, file 1187, PAC.

24. Ogilvie to Secretary, Department of the Interior, 11 December 1900, RG91, Vol. 7, file 1187, PAC; Commissioner to Bompas, 27 September 1900, ibid.


26. Hawksley to McLean, 25 November 1915, IAB, 801/50-0-1; Hawksley to McLean, 19 October 1917, IAB, 801/30-18-8; Bethune to Superintendent of Trusts and Reserves, 14 May 1958, IAB, 801/30-0-1; Meek to Indian Affairs Branch, 17 February 1948, IAB, 801/50-18-8. The relocations were all due to white demands that the land grant be altered. By 1950, those Indians living near Whitehorse no longer inhabited the reserve.

27. Strickland to Officer in Command, Upper Yukon, 16 August 1898, IAB, 801/30-3-5; Pereira to White, 14 September 1898, ibid.

28. C. Swanson to Commissioner, 1 September 1915, RG91, Vol. 46, file 29,995; Brownlee to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 19 August 1916, IAB, file 801/30-4-10; Report of Survey of Little Salmon Indian Reserve, c. 1916, ibid.

29 W. Bompas to Commissioner, 29 November 1904, RG91, Vol. 29, file 13,013; J.J. Wright to Supt. General of Indian Affairs, 4 February 1902, IAB, file 801/30-0-1.

30. Brusar to Deputy Superintendent General, 17 June 1907, DIA, Vol. 6479, file 940-1, pt. 1; Congdon to F. Podley, 28 April 1903, DIA, Vol. 3962, file 147,654-1, pt. 1; Secretary Dawson Board of Trade to Rt. Hon. Frank Oliver, 19 August 1911, DIA, Vol. 4062, file 398,746-1. The latter documents refers to a suggestion by the Dawson Board of Trade, seconded by Bishop Bompas, that the government import reindeer and hire the Indians to tend the herds. Like the other proposals, this one focused on keeping Indians and whites separate.

31. Commissioner of Y.T. to J.B. Harken, 16 March 1922, YRI, Series 3, Vol. 2, file 12-14B; Report by A.W. Elling, 16 January 1923, ibid., file 12-13C. As part of the establishment of preserves in the North West Territories, part of the Peel River valley was incorporated into a game reservation. This 1923 action was not designed to address the needs of the Yukon
Indians, but rather was to preserve the hunting grounds of the Peel River Kutchin and other Mackenzie River basin native groups. Fumoleau, *As Long As This Land Shall Last*, 245-250; O.S. Finnie to Inspector Wood, 6 June 1925, YRG1, Series 3, Vol. 2, file 12-4C.

32. Extract from a report by Harper Reed, 8 May 1935, YRG1, Series 3, Vol. 8, file 12-15A.


35. Gibson to Gibben, 19 May 1947, YRG1, Series 3, Vol. 11, file 12-22; Meek to Indian Affairs Branch, 3 July 1947, DIA, Vol. 6761, file 420-12-2-2; Extract from Indian Agent Meek's Quarterly Report, 1 July 1947 to 30 September 1947, 10 October 1947, YRG1, Series 3, Vol. 11, file 12-22.


37. Gibson to Hoffmaster, 23 January 1943, YRG1, Series 3, Vol. 10, file 12-20B. This program entailed significant costs. Increased hunting during World War II, largely by American servicemen and construction workers, seriously depleted game stocks in the Kluane Lake area. In December 1942, a sizeable tract of land in the district was set aside as a game preserve (it eventually became Kluane National Park). Importantly, natives were not permitted to hunt within the preserve. Ibid.; Robert McCandless, *Yukon Wildlife: A Social History*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985: 64-87.


39. J.D. McLean to John Hawksley, 4 March 1914, YRG1, Series 2, file 29,299;
Supt. General to Governor General in Council, 12 January 1914, DIA, Vol. 1129, Deputy Superintendent's Letterbook, 4 February 1911 - 29 May 1914; Stringer to Martin, GSA, M74-3, file 1-A-5-A; Hawksley to McLean, 17 April 1929, DIA, Vol. 7155, file 80153-10, pt.1: Hawksley to McLean, 13 June 1919, ibid.; see also Hawksley's reports in Department of Indian Affairs, *Annual Reports*, especially 1915-1916, pp. 115-117 and 1917, p. 30. Hawksley's efforts were directed in particular toward improving native living conditions, especially in the areas of sanitation, and native-white interaction. His aims to this latter domain were accomplished through imposing curfews and restricting native access to the towns.


44. Smart to McLean, 30 April 1902, DIA, Vol. 4001, file 207,418; White to Smart, 1 January 1901, ibid.; Accountant to Secretary, 1 May 1902, ibid.


50. Auditor General of Canada, Annual Report, 1902-1903 J-78; ibid., 1904-1905, J-62. The natives obviously patronized the service. Doctors were paid $2 per authorized consultation. In 1901-1902, the two busiest doctors, NWMP assistant surgeon G. Madore and medical doctor L.S. Sugden received $1516 and $1113 respectively from the government, thus accounting for close to 1300 visits between them.


53. John Hawksley to A.F. Mackenzie, 29 August 1933, RGgl, Vol. 9, file 149h

54. Memorandum on Indian Missions and Indian Schools, submitted on behalf of the Special Indian Committee of the M.S.C.C., 14 March 1906, GSA75-
55. Frank Oliver to A.C.C., 28 January 1908, GS75-103, Series 2-14, M.S.C.C.; Frank Pedley to Rev. Norman Tucker, 21 March 1908, ibid.; Notes of an Interview with Frank Oliver, 26 February 1909, YTA, AC, New Series, file 2.


